The post-World War II history of Chicago price theory has many distinguishing facets, one of which is its identification and self-identification as "Marshallian," as against the Walrasian general equilibrium, Samuelsonian, and game-theoretic tides that swept over economics during the second half of the twentieth century. A second important piece of this history is the application of rational choice analysis in areas to which economics had not, to that point, pretended to speak and where individual actions were said to be governed by motives apart from those considered by economists in their studies of the "economic" portion of the social sphere. These facets of the history of Chicago price theory come together on several fronts, and we shall consider one of these-altruism, or otherregarding behavior-here.
Introduction
The post-World War II history of Chicago price theory has many distinguishing facets, one of which is its identification and self-identification as "Marshallian," as against the Walrasian general equilibrium, Samuelsonian, and game-theoretic tides that swept over economics during the second half of the twentieth century. A second important piece of this history is the application of rational choice analysis in areas to which economics had not, to that point, pretended to speak and where individual actions were said to be governed by motives apart from those considered by economists in their studies of the "economic" portion of the social sphere. These facets of the history of Chicago price theory come together on several fronts, and we shall consider one of these-altruism, or otherregarding behavior-here.
The question of whether, and to what extent, Chicago price theory is Marshallian is a large one, with many aspects. The theory of individual behavior is one of these, and the treatment of altruism, or, more generally, other-regarding behavior, falls within this domain. The centrality of of self-interest-in various forms and with various degrees of attendant enlightenment-has ruled the analysis of economic phenomena virtually unchallenged for more than two millenia, 2 not as a goal, but as a seemingly unshakable force driving individual actions, at least when dealing with activities related to the marketplace. As Henry Sidgwick put it in his Principles of Political Economy, selfinterest works "powerfully and continually," and its utility in the economic sphere is such that "the difficulty of finding any adequate substitute for it, either as an impulsive or as a regulating force, is an almost invincible obstacle in the way of reconstructing society on any but its present individualistic basis" (Sidgwick 1901, p. 402) . That individual behavior had an other-regarding aspect was widely acknowledged, but this was seen as more or less irrelevant to the economic realm, and the analysis of such behavior was thought to be outside of the province of political economy. The recent (and controversial) move to incorporate altruism into the modeling process of economists, including by Gary Becker and others in the Chicago price theory community, thus represents a significant departure from previous practice.
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The self-consciously Marshallian nature of Chicago price theory, in turn, leads us to examine the relationship of this altruistic turn to the work of Marshall, particularly in his Principles.
One of the things that unites Marshall's work in the Principles and important parts of the history of Chicago price theory is the refusal to ground economic analysis in a particular model of human behavior. For example, while Marshall hoped to link up economics and psychology and Milton Friedman was trying to maintain a strict separation, neither went so far as to ground the theory of demand within a well-developed theory of the individual. All of this changed with the adoption of the rational actor model in the post-war period. The idea that rational choice offered a unified theory of behavior applicable across the realm of individual choices presented the prospect of a vastly expanded scope for economic analysis. Other-regarding behavior was one example of this. Is such behavior separate from the rational pursuit of self-interest, a force that is weighed against selfinterest with greater or lesser motive force, depending on the context? Is such behavior the outcome of a choice process? Or is it a part of the choice process, but one that is done rationally, though not self-interestedly? Or is it something else all together? As we shall see, we find rather different answers to this question in Marshall and in the Chicago price theory literature. At the same time, however, Marshall offers some hints that the expansion of the scope of economics in directions such as this does not necessarily take the economist outside of the legitimate scope of his inquiry. Indeed, Gary Becker's work on social interactions in general and altruism in particular can be seen as a response to certain of the issues raised by Marshall when he discussed the limits of economic analysis.
Marshall and Man
When Alfred Marshall defined economics as "a study of mankind in the ordinary business of life" (1920, p. 1), 4 he was forced to confront the issue of the scope of life that is relevant for economicsthat is, to define what makes up "the ordinary business of life." For Marshall, this extended to those parts of life which are "most closely connected with the attainment and with the use of the material requisites of wellbeing" (1920, p. 1) . When the political economists of the nineteenth century developed their theories, says Marshall, they assumed an essential homogeneity among the population and did so based on their own understanding of society. This, however, was informed by their position in the world, and a problem arose from the fact that "The people whom they knew were basically city men; and they took it for granted tacitly that other Englishmen were very much like those they knew in the city" (1885, p. 155) . It was this view of man that, for Marshall, motivated the classical understanding of the workings of supply and demand. But by not recognizing that "the point of view of the workman" is different from that of the city man, and by not "allowing for his [the workman's] human passions, his instincts and habits, his sympathies and antipathies, his class jealousies and class adhesiveness, his want of knowledge and of the opportunities for free and vigorous action," the classical economists bestowed on supply and demand "a much more mechanical and regular action than they actually have" (1885, p. 155).
Marshall's statement that "Economics is a science of motives," quoted at the start of this paper, informs his conception of economic theory. He believed that "the true philosophic raison d'etre of [economic] theory is that it supplies a machinery to aid us in reasoning about those motives of human behavior which are measurable." (1885, p. 158). Marshall said that economics focuses on those motives which guide individual action in the business realm, the central motivating force here being "the desire for pay" (1920, p. 14) . Marshall saw in the motive force of money a means to make economics scientific in a manner beyond other forms of social study. Money, he said, offered a means by which "the force of a person's motives-not the motives themselves, since economics is not about measuring motives, but their effects-can be approximately measured (1920, p. 15) ; in fact, he labeled it "the most obvious … and also the best, in terms of ease of measurability" (1885, p.
158).
For Marshall, it was measurability, rather than money, that was the key. Thus we find him citing "honours" as another measurable motive to which the economist can pay attention in their work. What matters, says Marshall, is that the honors take measurable form and can be transferred from one individual to another. More generally, Marshall goes on to say that It seems well to insist on this; for a misleading association has grown up in people's minds between that measurement of motives, which is the chief task of economic science, and an exclusive regard for material wealth, to the neglect of other and higher objects of desire. The only condition required for a measure for economic purposes is that it should be something definite and transferable. Its taking a material form is practical and convenient in this world, but is not essential (1885, p. 159).
In fact, argues Marshall, it is possible to envision "a treatise on economic theory" very similar to those extant in the 1880s, but in which there is "very little mention … of material things, and no mention at all of money" (1885, p. 159).
The evolving importance of business life contributed to the utility of a monetary measure, according to Marshall, both by making the desire for pay a primary motivating force and by influencing the development of man's habits of thought. Those habits of thought attending modern business life, said Marshall, are self-reliance, forethought, and "deliberate and free choice," all of which have increased, he says, with the development of industrial and business life in the modern age (1920, p. 10) . Within this, Marshall particularly highlights deliberateness, arguing that it is this, and not selfishness (as many were claiming in that age) that is "the characteristic of the modern age" (1920, p. 6) .
While allowing that it may be best to keep economics "chiefly focused with those motives to which a money price can be directly or indirectly assigned" (1885, p. 161), Marshall does not subscribe to the view that this forces economics into limiting its view of man to that of a purely selfinterested agent. "Whenever we get a glimpse of the economic man he is not selfish," Marshall says.
"On the contrary he is generally hard at work saving capital chiefly for the benefit of others. The fact is that the desire to make provision for one's family acts in a very regular way and is eminently capable of being reduced to law: it is prominent in all economic reasoning, because, though unselfish, it is measurable" (1885, p. 160). Given this, says Marshall, selfish or self-regarding motives "have no claim to more consideration than others except in so far as they may be more easily measurable and may more easily have a money price assigned to them" (1885, p. 161).
Marshall insists that the attempts to consider "economic man" apart from ethics-that is, to contemplate individuals who "pursue gain … mechanically and selfishly"-have not been successful.
For example, he says, man attempts to provide for his family, and does so from altruistic motives.
But if altruism is active here, why not also in other areas? It exhibits to sort of general uniformities that self-interest does-that is, both self-interest and altruism are motives to action. The "Principle of Continuity," says Marshall, implies "a continuous gradation from the action of 'city men,' which are based on deliberate and far-reaching calculations, and are executed with vigour and ability, to those of ordinary people who have neither the power nor the will to conduct their affairs in a business-like way" (1920, pp. vi-vii) . Economists, he says, deal with man as he is: not with an abstract or 'economic' man; but a man of flesh and blood.
They deal with a man who is largely influenced by egoistic motives in his business life to a great extent with reference to them; but who is also neither above vanity and recklessness, nor below delight in doing his work well for its own sake, or in sacrificing himself for the good of his family, his neighbors, or his country; a man who is not below the love of a virtuous life for its own sake. They deal with man as he is: but being concerned chiefly with those aspects of life in which the action of motive is so regular that it can be predicted, and the estimate of the motor-forces can be verified by results, they have established their work on a scientific basis (1920, pp. 26-27) .
Within these groups, says Marshall, there are regularities of behavior, both self-interested and altruistic, that make "the theory of normal value … applicable to the actions of the unbusiness-like classes in the same way, though not with the same precision of detail, as to those of the merchant or banker" (1920, p. vii).
Marshall notes that both self-interested and other-regarding behavior present a problem for economic analysis in that both types of motives operate indirectly. There is a series of steps between one's demand for consumer goods and their ultimate provision; likewise, there are "many steps between the sacrifice of a parent, who sends his son to an expensive school, and the ultimate production of a carpet from the designs of that son when he is grown up" (1885, p. 161). This complicates the process of economic analysis: "So difficult is this analysis, so subtle are the processes of economic reasoning involved in it, so many are the different factors and forces mutually modifying one another of which account must be taken, so numerous are the wheels within wheels in the reasoning involved, that up to the present day the task is but half-mastered" (1885, p. 161).
But this this problem put to one side, Marshall notes that in considering behavior that is selfinterested or other-regarding, the economist is not concerned about higher and lower motives per se; his interest is in looking at their effects and their incentives to action (1920, p. 16 ). Both self-interest and altruism can be deliberate or not, but the economist is concerned with the deliberate side of each (1920, pp. 20-21 ).
Marshall's reading of history suggested to him that altruism did not function well at an aggregate level for any considerable period of time, save for in religious orders. At the family level, though, he found altruism quite prevalent. For example, he says, some are motivate by the desire to accumulate wealth for themselves (pure self-interest), but many others are motivated by a desire to care for their family and leave a generous bequest to their children. To bolster his case that "men labour and save chiefly for the sake of their families and not for themselves," Marshall points to the strong tendency of individuals to consume only out of the income from their savings during their retirement, leaving the principal untouched, along with the propensity to invest in life insurance policies (1920, p. 228) .
Man may do something for the benefit of others out of self-interest or out of a more pure altruism. The latter characterizes affections within the family. This includes gifts to family members, investment in education or training for one's children, and the decision to leave a bequest (1920, p. 24) . The problem, he notes, is that it is difficult to measure these altruistic motives. While certain form of altruism are measurable-he cites aggregate charitable giving-and can be reduced to lawlike form, and the demand for and supply of missionaries, clergy, nurses, and the like can be welldescribed using the tools of demand and supply, it will "probably always be true that the greater part of these actions, which are due to a feeling of duty and love of one's neighbour, cannot be classed, reduced to law and measured; and it is for this reason, and not because they are not based on selfinterest, that the machinery of economics cannot be brought to bear on them" (1920, p. 24) .
Even allowing for the range of possible motives, Marshall says that economists take as their subject the realm of distribution, exchange, industry, …-that is, the economy-and his definition of the scope of economics as dealing "with that part of individual and social action which is most closely connected with the attainment and with the use of the material requisites of wellbeing" (1920, p. 1) would seem to confine the work of economists within the boundaries of the economic system. This view is in some measure confirmed, but with qualifications, in his comments on "The Scope and Method of Economics" in Appendix C of the Principles. Here, Marshall cites Comte's assertion that "a unified and all-embracing social science" is necessitated by the interconnectedness of all aspects of social life (1920, p. 770) . Against this, Marshall contends for specialization, on the ground that "the whole range of man's actions in society is too wide and too various to be analyzed and explained by a single intellectual effort" (1920, p. 770) . As for economics, The economic organon brings to bear the accumulated strength of much of the best genius of many generations of men. It shows how to analyse the motives at work, how to group them, how to trace their mutual relations. And thus by introducing systematic and organized methods of reasoning, it enables us to deal with this one side of the problem with greater force and certainty than almost any other side; although it would have probably been the most unmanageable side of all without such aid. (1885, p. 164) He illustrates this point by reference to the natural science, where, he says, real progress in understanding the forces of nature was only made with the division of scientific inquiry into several branches. Such progress as has been made in exposing the essential unity of natures forces, he says, is the result of "persistent specialized study" rather than the use of or quest for an over-arching unified science. This same approach, he says, will be necessary to uncover forces operative across the social realm.
That said, Marshall does not insist on a rigid separation between the social sciences. Rather, he says, "it is the duty of those who are giving their chief work to a limited field, to keep up close and constant correspondence with those who are engaged in neighbouring fields." This allows for a form of gains from exchange, in that "Specialists who never look beyond their own domain are apt to see things out of true proportion; much of the knowledge they get together is of comparatively little use; they work away at the details of old problems with have lost most of their significance and have been supplanted by new questions rising out of new points of view; and they fail to gain that large illumination which the progress of every science throws by comparison and analogy on those around it" (1920, pp. 770-71) . With this in mind, then, it is perhaps not surprising that we find Marshall hesitant about the expansion of the boundaries of economics but at the same time not willing to foreclose the possibility of others fruitfully tilling this soil in the future. He suggest that economics "has made greater advances than any other branch of the social sciences because it is more definite and exact than any other" (1920, p. 780) . But this, he says, is a direct result of having confined the scope of economics to economic phenomena which are measurable. To move beyond this involves some risk, according to Marshall, in that "every widening of its scope involves some loss of this scientific precision" (1920, p. 780) . The question then becomes "whether that loss is greater or less than the gain resulting from its greater breadth of outlook," and this, he says, "is not to be decided by any hard and fast rule" (1920, p. 780) .
Interlude: Marshall and Chicago-An Overview
From its origins in the price theory courses taught by Frank Knight and Jacob Viner in the 1920s, Chicago price theory has been overtly Marshallian-that is, it is rooted in the economics of Alfred (Friedman 1949 )-demand theory being at the heart of Chicago price theory at least until the ascendancy of Becker and the rational choice approach.
In spite of the tendency to speak in terms of a homogeneous, monolithic "Chicago school," Chicago price theory, like Chicago economics generally, is both heterogeneous and has evolved over time, retaining some measure of continuity, but also changing in significant ways (Reder 1982 Even allowing for this heterogeneity, there is a significant distinction to be drawn between the earlier and later generations of Chicago price theory-that is, between Knight, Viner, and Friedman on the one hand and the generation from Becker onward on the other (with Stigler having a foot in each camp).
As noted above, early Chicago price theory was grounded in demand theory. There was an underlying idea of utility maximization, but only in an "as if" sense. With Stigler and Becker, we see price theory placed on a rational choice footing: individuals are deemed to be rational maximizers, not necessarily of utility, but of whatever their chosen ends may be. It is an approach to economics that was much more influenced by the axiomatic turn in the profession during the 1950s and 60s.
Demand theory was sufficient to explain prices; a more refined behavioral grounding was necessary to explain choices. This distinction is of tremendous import, as Chicago price theory increasingly came to define economics as the analysis of choice rather than as the study of the economic organization. In doing so, it moved from a subject-matter definition of economics to an analytical one, and from a focus on the market to a focus on individual behavior as, at least, the starting point for economic analysis. This approach offered an account of a far greater variety of behaviors than did earlier approaches to consumer behavior. To get a sense for the relationship between Marshall's system and Chicago price theory, consider the case of consumer behavior. Marshall's view was that economists "deal with man as he is: not with an abstract or 'economic' man; but a man of flesh and blood" (1920, p. 22) . Now Marshall was convinced that there is much to be learned from using a conception of man that is grounded in utility maximization, as when he noted that "the side of life with which economics is specially concerned is that in which man's conduct is most deliberate, and in which he most often reckons up the advantages and disadvantages of any particular action before he enters on it" (1920, p.
17). 7
However, Marshall also took pains to point out that this is not the whole of the story. There are 6 It is important to be clear that we are talking about price theory and microeconomics here. The last two decades of Chicago macroeconomics evidence a significant Walrasian component. It also bears noting that Chicago price theory has resisted the game-theoretic turn of economics, which explains why Nobel Laureate Roger Myerson is a University of Chicago microeconomist but not one who is identified with the Chicago tradition in price theory or affiliated with the Becker Center on Chicago Price Theory. 7 See more generally Marshall (1920, Chapter 2) . times, he said, when man's actions are guided by "habit and custom," and here man "proceeds for the moment without calculation." In cases where we are dealing with business-related affairs, Marshall contended that those habits and customs likely evolved out of "a close and careful watching the advantages and disadvantages of different courses of conduct." And of course, these advantages and disadvantages may be material or non-material, with the latter including factors such as whether a particular course of action is fair, or whether it "feels" right to do things this way rather than that (1920, p. 17 ).
Marshall's sense that calculation does not govern all areas of life, or even particular areas in all circumstances, made him something less than fully confident in the conclusions drawn from economic theorizing. In adopting this stance, Marshall very clearly demarcated economics from natural sciences such as physics, pointing out that the results of economics are not like the laws of gravitation where, subject to a few ceteris paribus qualifications, we can state our expectations very concretely. For Marshall, economic theories are tendency statements, and of a somewhat weak sort.
The further we move away from economic affairs proper within the social realm, the weaker he thought those tendencies became (1920, p. 27) . There is, he said, "a continuous gradation from social laws concerned almost exclusively with motives that can be measured by price, to social laws in which such motives have little place." The latter, he went on to argue, are "generally much less precise and exact than economic laws," just as economic laws are much less exact and precise than those of physical sciences (1920, p. 27 ).
The Chicago approach to individual behavior both has elements in common with and is distinct from the approach laid out by Marshall in his Principles. In Friedman, for example, we see the individual described as one who behaves as if he maximized expected utility. This "as if" approach was part of an attempt by Friedman to loose economics from reliance an any particular psychological presuppositions-as against Marshall's desire to put economics on a more firm psychological footing-and was intended not as a description of individual behavior but as part of a model that would generate testable predictions (Friedman 1953) . In this, then, Friedman's approach departed significantly from Marshall's attempt to "treat man as he is." Stigler and Becker took a different tack, positing rational choice as a descriptor of individual behavior and departures from this as outliers. In doing so, they brought psychology back into economics, although in a manner different from Marshall. The rational choice approach embodied a more narrow conception of the agent than is found in Marshall, but in the hands of Stigler and Becker, this model, like Marshall's, was intended to be a reasonably accurate depiction of individual behavior. In light of this, it is perhaps no surprise that Becker and others attempted to extend the boundaries of economic analysis to the explanation of a wider range of behaviors that economists had previously countenanced.
Modeling the "Other": Becker, Chicago, and Other-Regarding Behavior
It is tempting to view Becker's work on altruism-first laid out fully in his 1974 paper, "A Theory of Social Interactions," as simply another iteration in a longer-term program of economics imperialism.
By this time, Becker had already published books and articles dealign with topics such as discrimination, human capital, the allocation of time, crime and punishment (1968), fertility, and marriage (1973, 1974 ). Yet, Becker's work on altruism began already in 1960, and the 1974 paper was in draft form as early as 1969. Tracing the lineage of the 1974 paper reveals that the story behind the development of Becker's work on other-regarding behavior is somewhat more complex than a simplistic economics imperialism story might suggest.
In fact, Becker grounds his analysis of other-regarding behavior not in the need to explain something that psychologists, anthropologists, and sociologists have not explained adequately, but in the preoccupations of economic thinkers of the nineteenth century. He traces the social interactions issue back to the economics literature prior to the marginal revolution, pointing to references by Jeremy Bentham to reputation effects and the pleasures or pains that others might receive from one's benevolent or malevolent acts, and he also highlights references to the desire for distinction that can be found in the writings of Nassau Senior and Alfred Marshall. Some may find it ironic, given the technical nature of much of Becker's work in this vein, to find Becker arguing that the increasing formalization of economics that began with the marginal revolution worked to push factors such as reputation and benevolence out of economic analysis, as economics came to define the choice process as derived from utility functions whose arguments were own consumption of good and services (1974a, pp. 1064-65). As Becker notes, "Probably the main explanation for the neglect of social interactions by economists is neither analytical intractability nor a preoccupation with more important concepts, but excessive attention to formal developments during the last 70 years. As a consequence, even concepts considered to be important by earlier economists, such as social interactions, have been shunted aside" (1974a, p. 1091).
The question, then, was whether it was possible to deal with this concern via modern, formal analytical methods. As we have seen, this question had also concerned Marshall, who both wondered about the ability to deal with broad ranges of human behavior within the analytical framework available to the economist and expressed hesitation about the explanatory power of economic analysis as one moved further away from the traditional market turf of the economist. The ability to undertake the analysis of other-regarding behavior within the increasingly formal environment of post-WWII economics required the development of a modeling strategy (or set of strategies) that would allow for the incorporation of these other-regarding factors within the individual's decision process. But Becker did not consider it sufficient simply to develop a mathematically sophisticated notion of other-regarding behavior. Reflecting the influence of Marshall and Friedman on Becker, there was a further requirement: "The basic goal of the analysis," he said, "is to find measures [of economic variables] which facilitate the development of empirical implications" (1974a, p. 496).
Other-regarding utility: the analysis of discrimination
An examination of Becker's work in the two decades following the completion of his graduate training at Chicago suggests that the roots of his analysis of altruism lie in his dissertation work on discrimination. Becker himself has said virtually as much, noting in 1974 that his interest in analyzing social interactions "can probably be traced to" his work on discrimination (1957), the analysis of which incorporated factors including "the race, religion, sex, or other personal characteristics of employees, fellow workers, customers, dealers, neighbors, etc., into utility functions" (1974a, p. 1065). It was not long thereafter that Becker (1961) tackled the subject of philanthropy in a paper for the National Bureau of Economic research project on the economics of philanthropy. The Economics of Discrimination is important here for two reasons. The first, and most obvious, is that Becker developed a model in which attributes of others were incorporated into the individual's decision function. This was done by positing a "taste for discrimination," which involves elements of prejudice (a preference) and/or ignorance (e.g., underestimating productivity), the effect of which was that employing, working with, purchasing from, or selling to a member of a particular group would reduce the utility of the decision maker and thereby influence perceptions of the wage or price that was paid or received. That is, The Economics of Discrimination captured social interaction by integrating the effect of someone else's attributes (race, religion, sex, etc.) into individual willingness to pay. Money, commonly used as a measuring rod, will also serve as a measure of discrimination. If an individual has a 'taste for discrimination,' he must act as if he were willing to pay something, either directly or in the form of a reduced income, to be associated with some persons instead of others. When actual discrimination occurs, he must, in fact, either pay or forfeit income for this privilege" (1957, p. 6).
The discrimination coefficient that emerges here measures the value that the individual places on these non-monetary costs, being the difference between the money price and the net price. But as he points out, this analysis is not limited to "negative" discrimination: love is simply the converse of hatred, which means that this same framework can be used to show the benefits that one gets from engaging in activities with one whom you love. Here, then, we find the seed of an examination of altruistic behavior.
Though this work put motives for discrimination into an economic framework, in taking on this subject Becker did not set out to offer a substitute for the analyses of discrimination within other social science disciplines. Instead, he says that his goal was to develop a theory of discrimination that supplements the psychologists' and sociologists' analysis of causes with an analysis of economic consequences. While even the causes are not well understood, the absence of adequate discussions of consequences is probably the most serious lacuna in the literature on this subject. This theory can be applied to "discrimination" and "nepotism" in all their diverse forms, whether the discrimination be against Negroes, Jews, women, or persons with "unpleasant" personalities or whether the nepotism be in favor of blood relatives, countrymen, or classmates, since they have in common the use of nonmonetary considerations in deciding whether to hire, work with, or buy from an individual or group (1957, p. 3, emphasis added).
Becker harkens forward to what is to come when he says, at the close of the book, that this work on discrimination "can be viewed as a case study in the quantitative analysis of non-pecuniary variables," and that, given the emphasis on non-pecuniary factors in the choice of things such as occupation and working conditions, the development of such a general framework may be "the most useful by-product" of his work on discrimination.
It is also important to note the general approach taken by Becker in The Economics of Discrimination and its relationship to Chicago price theory as it stood in the late 1950s. As in both Marshall and Friedman, the theory of individual choice occupies a relatively minor place in the analysis, the focus instead being on the prices that individuals are willing to pay or accept and how this both feeds into and is impacted by the operation of market processes. Objective functions and concepts such as maximization (rarely mentioned) and rationality (unmentioned) play no overt role in the analysis-even in the mathematical appendices spread through the book. While one can easily see how the equilibrium conditions presented in the appendices are the outcomes of a maximization process, the actual form and nature of this process are not considered sufficiently important to merit attention. This stands in stark contrast to later work by Becker, where the rational choice concept features prominently in the analysis, and almost certainly reflects the influence of Friedman, whom Becker thanks in the introduction not just for his comments on the manuscript, but "for training in economic analysis and for continually emphasizing that economic analysis can be used for the solution of important social problems" (1957, p. 4).
Full income and the household production function
Perhaps the most significant moment on the road to the theory of social interactions, and thus altruism, was the publication by Becker, in 1965, of his "A Theory of the Allocation of Time." The paper begins with what Becker calls "A Revised Theory of Choice," (p. 495), which broke away from the received theory in three ways. First, it posited the household, rather than the individual, as the basic unit of analysis. Second, it incorporated both working and non-working time into the model. Finally, the model assumed that households produce the commodities that enter their utility function using a combination of time and market goods. In formulation the notion that households are producers as well as consumers, Becker invokes Alec Cairncross's 1958 reference to the household as "'a small factory'" that "combines capital goods, raw materials and labour to clean, feed, procreate and otherwise produce useful commodities." (1965 ( , p. 496, quoting Cairncross 1958 ).
Becker's model of household and individual behavior consciously draws on the theory of the firm, with utility functions maximized with respect to both income-related variables and production functions that posit a relationship between utility-generating commodities and the resources devoted to their production by the individual. Here, then, households "are both producing units and utility maximizers" (p. 495).
According to this new theory of choice, households are said to maximize a utility function of the form:
where the Z's are conceptualized not as basic commodities (bread, meat, books, …) but as larger categories of goods-meals, health, ...-that are produced at the household level. These goods are said to be the products of a household production function of the form,
where x i is a vector of market goods and T i is a vector of time inputs used in the production of the ith commodity. Utility is maximized subject to budget and time constraints, which combine to generate an expression for what Becker labels "full income." 10 Full income, S, is given by,
where w is a vector of earnings associated with the various units of time and V is other income and represents the maximum amount of money that is achievable by the household if all time were devoted to working in the market (earning income). The budget constraint thus becomes:
which says that full income is spent on a combination of goods and foregone earnings necessary for household production.
For Becker, the utility of this new approach lies in its generality: 10 Becker (1965, p. 497) says that this term "emerged from a conversation with Milton Friedman." the full income approach provides a meaningful resource constraint and one firmly based on the fact that goods and time can be combined into a single overall constraint because time can be converted into goods through money income. It also incorporates a unified treatment of all substitutions of non-pecuniary for pecuniary income, regardless of their nature or whether they occur on the job or in the household (p. 498).
The import of this for our purposes comes from the last, and most brief (one paragraph) of the applications offered by Becker-the division of labor within families. Families not only allocate time across commodities, but also allocate this time across family members. The full income model suggests that family members who are more efficient at market activities will devote more of their time to such activities, and less time to consumption activities, than will other family members.
Similarly, if one family member's market efficiency increases relative to the others, that family member will devote an increased amount of time to market activities and other family members will correspondingly devote more time to consumption activities. In this way, then, Becker begins to capture other-regarding behavior, in that the choices made by each member of the family are a function of the situations of other family members. The move to model full income and the household production function was the first of two key theoretical moves on the road from discrimination to altruism. The second came from the extension of the household production function to include what Becker calls "environmental variables," such as age, education, climate, and ability. This expanded version of the model was incorporated into Becker's graduate price theory lectures at Columbia in the late 1960s and written up in a draft paper under the title "Consumption Theory: Some Criticisms and a Suggested Approach" in 1968.
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The first published appearance of the expanded theory was in Becker's graduate price theory text, Economic Theory, which was published in 1971 and was itself derived from the tape-recorded lectures of his price theory course at Columbia in 1967-68. One of the advantages of this new approach to consume behavior is that it allows for the introduction of these "environmental" variables through the household production function rather than through tastes and preferences.
Changes in these variables affect the cost of producing the good in question: for example, a more educated parent can give his or her child a given amount of education at lower monetary cost than a parent who is less well-educated by virtue of what they themselves can provide for the child. These variables enter the demand function not through the influence of tastes, but because "they change the efficiency of household production." The effects on demand can be described statistically and can also be predicted. This is an important advance, since as Becker sees it, "By reducing the reliance on ad hoc shifts in tastes, this method of handling environmental variables is a powerful too for greatly expanding the predictive content of economic theory" (1971, p. 48 For economists to rest a large part of their theory of choice on differences in tastes is disturbing since they admittedly have no useful theory of the formation of tastes, nor can they rely on a well-developed theory of tastes from any other discipline in the social sciences, since none exists. Put differently, the theory which the empirical researcher utilizes is unable to assist him in choosing the appropriate taste proxies on a prior grounds or in formulating predictions about the effects of these variables on behavior. The weakness in the received theory of choice, then, is the extent to which it relies on differences in tastes to "explain" behavior when it can neither explain how tastes are formed nor predict their effects (1973, p. 
380).
Another problem here, according to Michael and Becker (1973, pp. 380-81) is that the received theory is based on "money prices and money income," which makes it useful for the market sector but much less so for non-market activities that involve "the allocation of scarce resources among competing ends." They maintained that this focus on things that are measurable with money has "considerably limited" the appeal of economic theory among other social scientists because these other scientists' concerns are largely with behavior in the non-monetary realm. As such, they are not inclined to consider using economists' methods in their work. This is not surprising, argue Michael and Becker, given that a theory which relies on money prices is forced to explain "so much of observed behavior" by reference to "unexplained variations in tastes." For Michael and Becker, their new theory was the key to providing a framework for a more broad-based analysis of social phenomena, one that they believed was "capable of explaining a wide range of important phenomena with which the traditional theory does not cope."
The model of household choice was framed in a manner virtually identical to that in Becker's paper on the allocation of time. The consumer is assumed to maximize a utility function of the form,
where the Z's are the outcome of a household production function given by,
Here, E denotes the environmental variables, and they impact the amounts of x and t necessary to 12 Here we see a further link to the theory of production: The redefinition of the commodities that generate utility from basic goods, such as meat, vegetables, and drink, to goods, such as meals that the consumer produces himself by combining the basic goods purchased in the market with household time and environmental variables makes the demand for market goods a derived demand analogous to the derived demand for factor inputs (1973, p. 381) .
produce a given commodity, Z i . If households are able to affect the environment in which they live, they will substitute toward those things which enhance household productivity. For example, the households can "produce" higher education by attending school, better health by exercising, more favorable weather by moving to a better climate, or greater political stability by voting (1973, p.
393). As we shall see, this extends in straightforward fashion to altruism: people can produce greater welfare for others by undertaking actions that improve others' wellbeing.
Within this model, the first-order conditions for household utility maximization take the form,
The ratio of marginal utilities derived from additional units of Z i and Z j will be equal to the marginal costs of producing these goods. With the incorporation of the household production function into the analysis of consumption, households respond to changes in commodities prices and real income through efforts to minimize costs of production an maximize utility (1973, p. 386) . Within this, changes in the values of the environmental variables impact marginal cost by changing factor prices and input coefficients.
Michael and Becker point out that the household production function reflects an attempt to develop a theory of consumer choice that is consistent with Marshall's statement from their paper's epigraph: "Much that is of chief interest in the science of wants, is borrowed from the science of efforts and activities" (Michael and Becker 1973, p. 378) . They contend that the household production function model with environmental variables built in is operationally more useful and is not merely an attempt to camouflage taste differences. Instead of attributing behavioral differences to differences in tastes it focuses on income and price effects, so that differences in behavior are the result of differences in prices and incomes that result from differences in production processes. The result is that "some guidance about these [behavioral responses] can be obtained" from the new theory (1973, p. 391) . It is, they say, "a powerful tool of analysis" (1973, p. 394) which relies on chances in prices and quantities rather than changes in tastes to explain behavior and so does not require "heroic ingenuity or ad hoc theorizing." Becker (Treatise on the Family, p. 5) later calls this a "more complicated and more realistic version of the theory" of individual behavior than one finds in the standard utility theory approach.
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From environmental variables to other-regarding behavior
The process of incorporating other-regarding behavior into the household production function culminates in Becker's 1974 paper, "A Theory of Social Interactions," Here, the "new theory of consumer behavior" becomes "the modern (and very old!) theory of household behavior," (1974a, p.
1066), using the theory of basic wants, which he links to Bentham, Senior, and Marshall, along with the production function for producing the goods which satisfy those wants. Becker brings in social interactions by explicitly assuming that utility is a function not only of the environmental variables posited in his earlier formulations of household behavior but also of an additional (but distinct) environmental variable: the "characteristics of other persons that affect [the decision maker's] output of commodities" (1974a, p. 1066) within the household production function. Here, then, the decision problem is based on utility and production functions of the form,
where the R j are the characteristics of the other person. If the R j are allowed to vary under the influence of the person doing the choosing, one can get at interactions between persons or between persons and other social entities (1974a, p. 1066). For example, if distinction is the goal, as Senior and Marshall suggest that it may be, the individual can "produce" distinction by doing things like giving to charities.
Following Becker, assume that individual i's objective is to maximize the esteem in which he is held by others, so that the "good" in question, Z, is esteem and the utility function takes the form,
Suppose further that R is a function of i's efforts to gain esteem, h, and of factors independent of i's
The budget constraint faced by i is then given by,
where I i is money income, p R h is the amount spent on h, and p R is the price of a unit of R. Since
where S i is social income, the sum of money income and the value to I of his social environment. The first-order conditions thus give,
which is equivalent to the marginal benefit = marginal cost condition from Michael and Becker (1973) shown above.
The social environment thus contributes to social income, and the more it does so, the more the individual's welfare is determined by "the attitudes and behavior of others rather than by his own income" (1974a, p. 1070), and the relative importance of the social environment can be empirically estimated using data on expenditures motivated by these social interactions (1974a, p. 1071). The fact that the individual can change the social environment through his or her actions or expenditures is key here in terms of modeling other-regarding behavior.
The first application developed by Becker is here is the allocation of resources within the family: i and j are assumed to be married and i's utility depends on j's welfare. Again, following
Becker, assume that i's utility is determined by the amount of x that i and j consume, so that
where x j is a function of j's income, I j and any transfers that i makes to j. Then x j can be written as,
where h ij denotes the contributions from i to j. The social income of i can thus be written (assuming no transaction costs of transferring resources to j) as,
If transaction costs are zero, p R = p x , since i is transferring x to j. This implies that i's social income is
given by
The resulting first-order conditions are:
That is, the social income of i is equal to the combined incomes of i and j, and i receives equal marginal utility from his own consumption and from j 's consumption (1974a, pp. 1074-75) . Given this, a change in the distribution of family income between i and j has no impact on i's welfare (1974a, p. 1076).
The same basic result holds if we extend the analysis to the family as a whole: if the head of the household cares about all members of the family, the change in the distribution of income among members of the household will not affect the consumption or welfare of any of them so long as the head of the household continues to contribute to all household members.
This result has several implications. First, given that the head of household maximizes utility subject to a household budget constraint, anything that increases family income will increase the utility of the head, which means that he will "forfeit his own income if the incomes of other family members were increased even more" and conversely. Thus, he will fund a child's education or help set him up in a business if the net impact on family income is positive. In essence, the head "automatically internalizes the 'external' effects of his actions on other family members " (1974a, p. 1077) . In fact, he fully internalizes these externalities if his objective is to maximize family income.
14 As such, the head would take an action that impacted the consumption of a member of the family only when the value of the increase in consumption of the member who gains is greater than the value of the decrease in consumption to the member(s) whose consumption is diminished.
14 Becker notes the link to the Coase theorem here (1974a Coase theorem here ( , p. 1077 ), but there is a more significant link to the larger argument in "The Problem of Social Cost." Coase showed that a single firm that controlled both the externality-generating activity and the activity upon which the externality imposed costs would operate efficiently. Becker's model accomplishes the same thing within the household through the agency of the head by virtue of his effort to model the household as, in some respects, a firm.
Second, when the head's utility increases, other members of the family are also better off, even if the increase in the head's utility comes at the expense of other members of the family, since the head will then undertake to transfer resources to other family members in order to more than offset their losses. For example, if the head's preference for smoking cigars negatively impacts his wife and children, he will undertake other acts whose benefit to the wife and children offset these costs to them. (1974a, p. 1078) Third, the family utility function is identical with that of the head because the head's concern for all members integrates the utility functions of all household members in to "one consistent 'family ' utility function" (1974a, p. 1079) . This is not about dictatorial powers that reside in the head but about a head "who cares sufficiently about all other members to transfer resources voluntarily to them " (1974a, p. 1079) . Fourth, this same theory can explain interactions across the generations. For example, increases in government debt to fund current government programs or projects function as taxes on future generations. But, says Becker, this will result in increases in bequests, which will offset both 15 It is also not about patriarchy; Becker is explicit about the possibility of the head being either male or female (1974a, p 1079). 16 Becker goes on to note that this economizes on the amount of love required in a family, since "sufficient 'love' by one member leads all other members by 'an invisible hand' to act as if they too loved everyone" (p. 1080) the tax on future generations and the gain to the present generation from the goods that the tax on future generations was said to finance (1974a, p. 1077) .
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Another implication of the head's concern for other family members is that it serves as a form of self-insurance for each member of the family. For example, if k's income falls, i would attempt to offset this to some extent by transferring resources to k. This transfer to k would reduce i's consumption but keep his utility constant (ex post-that is, allowing for the impact on social income of the reduction in income originally suffered by k). Each member of the household thus shares in k's setback by consuming less as the head transfers more resources to k to help offset the income reduction (1974a, p. 1076).
From family to philanthropy
The issue of other-regarding behavior beyond the household, which includes philanthropy or charitable giving, represents a relatively simple extension of the model of interaction within the household and, Becker argues, provides a framework for analysis with much more robust implications than a standard utility theory model of charitable giving. The latter, he argues, would maximize a utility function of the form: While charitable giving may be motivated by multiple factors, including reputation or the desire to improve the welfare of others, Becker assumes that charitable giving is motivated by the latter. Formalizing this involves a simple extension of the household model is to define the "family as being made up of i and all those who are the recipients of i's charity. We then obtain a string of parallel results:
• losses to one member of this "family are offset by i's reallocation of his charitable giving;
• all "members" try to maximize family consumption rather than just their own consumption;
• charity becomes a form of self-insurance-if one member suffers a loss, other members will increase giving to him-and this in effect substitutes for government transfer programs and private insurance;
• as i's income increases, his charitable giving increase by a greater percentage than does the increase in the welfare of the recipients due to the magnitude of the relevant elasticities.
A further and what Becker labels "crucial" implication of the theory is that an increase in the income of recipients reduces charitable giving; given this, when the incomes of recipients and givers increase, giving will increase by less than if the incomes of givers alone increase (p. 1084). Of course, this implies that welfare payments reduce charitable giving. One can point to at least two aspects of Becker's analysis that consciously draw on Marshall.
First, Marshall had argued that human motivation has many facets and that regard for others was both among these and was an important motive for certain types of economic behavior, including that pertaining to the family. Yet, he saw economic theory, with its utility-maximizing approach, as illequipped to deal with these forms of behavior. That said, he was open to the prospect of the expansion of economics to account for a wider range of activity or phenomena than that discussed in the Principles or, indeed, in economics at large at the time of his writing.
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It would be easy to argue that Becker's general approach to economic analysis, though described by Becker himself as Marshallian in nature, really had nothing to do with Marshall. After all, Becker's rational choice theory and his emphasis on grounding economic analysis in the theory of individual behavior represent a significant departure from the theorizing evidenced in Marshall's
Principles. But such a stance is too simplistic. Becker's early work on discrimination was very much in the mold of Chicago Marshallianism, rooted in demand theory, a loose model of utility maximization, market-oriented, and tackling and important social-economic problem. The issue
18 Note that Wicksteed (1910 Wicksteed ( /1933 ) is an exception to this.
faced by Becker here and in much of his subsequent work was to devise a modeling strategy that could incorporate the characteristics of others within the Chicago Marshallian framework. The "taste for discrimination" accomplished exactly this-controversially, yes
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-and in a manner that was measurable and generated empirically testable implications. The framework here did not rely on advances made on the theoretical front in the time since Marshall's writing; it was straight-forward utility theory of the sort found in Jevons and Marshall and a set of demand and supply price equations that modified willingness to pay or offer for sale to account for discriminatory tastes.
Becker's work on the allocation of time accomplished the same thing, but this time by utilizing features on the budget constraint and household production function fronts. By combining the standard consumer budget constraint and the constraint of labor economics, Becker was able to arrive at his equation for full income of the household. This, in turn, allowed him to explore behavior at a level beyond that of the individual, through which he could analyze labor market interactions between husband and wife. It was only a short step from here to the analysis of other types of household interactions, a process that was facilitated by the incorporation of environmental variables the levels of which are a function of the decision-maker's own actions. And it was just a further short step to make the "others" individuals outside of the household-any individuals whose wellbeing enters the utility function of the individual/household decision maker. In sum, the theoretical system employed by Becker was not terribly far removed from that used by Marshall to underpin his demand theory. What was innovative here was the mechanism for modeling the "taste" factors that lead individuals to consider others in making behavioral choices.
Second, all of Becker's was done with measurability and empirical implications as necessary outcomes of the analysis, something that, as the above discussion of Marshall makes clear, was 19 See Fontaine (2007). central to Marshall's approach to theorizing. The concern for measurability and empirical testing is evidenced already in Becker's analysis of discrimination, and it is explicitly carried through subsequent work on the "new" approach to consumer behavior and its extensions. In the case of other-regarding behavior, the concept of social income plays a central role, being the sum of the individual's own income and the monetary value to him of the characteristics of others that are relevant for the problem at hand (Becker's "social environment"). The ability to monetize these aspects of behavior gives rise to straightforward empirical implications and facilitates the empirical testing that has been a hallmark of Chicago price theory since the mid-1940s.
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Also interesting here is that Becker is picking up on some of the less obvious bits of Marshall -trying to model things which Marshall referred to but which are not obvious parts of his analytical system. That is, against the traditional economics imperialism story, the development of the model of social interactions suggests that Becker is not just Marshall + rational choice + imperialism. Support for this can be found in Becker's own comments in the mid-1970s, when, after stating pointedly that he had "come to the position that the economic approach is a comprehensive one that is applicable to all human behavior," he goes on to say that, For whatever it is worth in evaluating this conclusion, let me indicate that I did not arrive at it quickly. In college I was attracted by the problems studied by sociologists and by the analytical techniques used by economists. These interests began to merge in my doctoral study, which used economic analysis to understand racial discrimination … Subsequently, I
applied the economic approach to fertility, education, the uses of time, crime, marriage, social interactions, and other "sociological," "legal," and "political" problems. Only after long 20 A related issue here is that of "as if" theorizing vs. theories that purport to describe human behavior. In a 1974 commentary on this new economics of the family, Becker says that "economic theory is very relevant in understanding and predicting significant aspects of human behavior" (1974b, p. 317). "Understanding" would seem to imply description rather than "as if" theorizing.
reflection on this work and the rapidly growing body of related work by others did I conclude that the economic approach was applicable to all human behavior " (1976b, p. 8) .
This would seem to take us well beyond Marshall, but the path to this point has a significant Marshallian heritage.
